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23 November 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR  
SUBJECT: Meeting of SANACC Subcommittee  
on Psychological Warfare

1. The SANACC Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare met today in Mr. Block's office with the following members present:

Chairman - Mr. Ralph Block - State Department  
Comdr. David Knoll - Navy Department  
Col. W. H. Kinard - Army Department

2. This was a short informal meeting during which Mr. Block informed the Subcommittee that he had spoken to Mr. Stone and to the SANACC staff regarding the decision of the Subcommittee members at the special meeting held last Friday, 19 November 1948. The SANACC staff, in turn, spoke to Mr. Saltzman, the Chairman of SANACC, and a call was put through to Mr. Lay of the National Security Council Staff. Mr. Lay, speaking for Mr. Square, expressed the view that the SANACC Subcommittee should continue to work.

3. Knoll said that he had taken the whole problem up with his "Admiral" who supports him in continuing to express the official Navy view, and who was informed by Knoll that he is preparing a special paper pointing up all of the problems as he sees them in the field of overt psychological warfare.

4. Knoll then stated that he heard, from a reliable source, that the Proposed NSC paper was drawn up merely to satisfy the immediate requirement of Mr. Forrestal. Now that the election is over and national tension somewhat eased, this paper would probably not go through. In fact, when the NSC Staff worked on this paper, they did not feel that it would be the document which would be sent to the National Security Council for approval.

5. The President's Committee on Information met yesterday at the Department of State. The meeting was attended by Mr. Ochsner and the members of his Subcommittee, and by Mr. Block. This group operates, I believe, under Mr. Reed of General Electric and are supposed to present their views directly to the President.

OSD & DOS review(s)  
completed.

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DRAFT REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON  
PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR WARTIME INFORMATION PROGRAMS AND  
RELATED ACTIVITIES

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the measures required for planning and making preparations for the conduct of information programs and overt psychological operations in the event of war or national emergency.

ANALYSIS

2. Responsibility within this government for the peacetime planning and preparation of information programs and related psychological operations to be carried on in the event of war has been partially but not completely defined.

a. Public Law 402, 80th Congress, places with the Secretary of State primary responsibility for conducting current foreign information activities. NSC-4 assigns primary responsibility to the Secretary of State for formulating policy for, and coordinating the implementation of, all foreign information measures of the US Government designed to influence attitudes in foreign countries in a direction favorable to the attainment of US objectives and to counter anti-US propaganda. While certain current planning functions are assigned to the State Department in NSC-4, no specific provision is made for the planning of wartime information programs.

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b. The planning activities envisaged in the NSC-10 Series did not include peacetime planning and preparation of overt wartime psychological operations.

c. No decision has been made as to whether domestic information programs in time of war should be directed by the agency which will conduct foreign information activities, or should be placed under a separate agency.

d. In the absence of further action, the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee Sub-Committee for Special Studies and Evaluation will be the only working nucleus within this government for the planning and coordination of wartime information programs and overt psychological operations.

e. The actions summarized above do not make adequate provision for coordination between (1) current information activities and planning for wartime programs, (2) planning for foreign and for domestic wartime information programs, (3) planning of wartime information programs and the activities envisaged in the NSC-10 Series.

3. There is a need to clarify responsibilities for planning and coordination of wartime information programs and related activities. Such clarification will facilitate orderly development of the plans necessary for implementation on short notice in time of emergency and make easier the transition from peacetime to wartime operations.

4. The State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee has

concurred in and submitted for consideration by the National Security Council the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that there should be established under the National Security Council as soon as practicable a psychological warfare organization with its peace-time scope limited to a working nucleus for planning and coordination. The Council did not take action upon this proposal as such, but did in connection with the NSC-10 Series adopt a different solution with respect to a major phase of the over-all problems. It is believed that the establishment of such an organization under the National Security Council continues to be undesirable. The supervision of such an organization would be contrary to the present concept of the Council as a policy planning rather than an operational planning agency, and would inevitably distract the Council from its primary function of formulating coordinated policy advice to the President.

#### CONCLUSIONS

5. There should be promptly established within the Department of State a nucleus organization to plan and make preparations for the coordinated conduct of foreign and domestic information programs and overt psychological operations abroad in the event of war or threat of war as determined by the President.

6. This organization should consist of:

a. A director appointed by the Secretary of State after consultation with other departments and agencies represented on the National Security Council.

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b. Policy consultants representing the Department of State and the National Military Establishment, including the three departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. A staff composed of qualified full-time personnel designated by the Department of State and the National Military Establishment, including the three departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The staff will also include liaison representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Resources Board.

7. The director of this organization should be responsible for:

a. Ensuring that plans for wartime information programs and related overt psychological operations are consistent with US policies and are coordinated with related planning under the NSC-10 Series.

b. Ensuring that plans for wartime foreign information programs and related overt activities are accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as being consistent with and complementary to approved plans for wartime military operations and command responsibilities.

8. The nucleus organization should plan immediately an interim arrangement for conducting and coordinating information programs and related activities in the initial stages of war or emergency, utilizing wherever practicable existing facilities of the Department of State and of the National Military Establishment.

9. When the nucleus organization is established, the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee Sub-Committee for Special Studies and Evaluation should be discontinued.